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notice appear on all such copies.Tinkering with Valuation Estimates: Is There a Future for Willingness to Accept
Measures?
The contingent valuation method (CVM), conceived in the 1940s and brought into wide
use in the 1970s and 1980s, has been used by economists to value a wide variety of non-market
goods and services, especially those with public good and non-use characteristics.  Carson
(2002) notes that over 5,000 contingent valuation studies have been performed. These studies
have employed either willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to accept (WTA) measures (in
some cases, both) to elicit valuation measures. 
The choice of WTP or WTA (and the compensating and equivalent variation measures
which underlie them) is indicative of the implied property rights scheme for the good in question;
for example, if a respondent has to pay to avoid pollution damages, the implication is that he or
she does not have the right to the “cleaner” scenario, and must pay to retain it.  However, while
one measure may be preferred to the other in a given situation due to the “correct” specification
of property rights, empirical estimates of WTA and WTP have tended to differ considerably. 
This begs the question as to which yields the “truer” valuation estimates.
In this paper, we derive both WTP and WTA contingent value estimates for a public
good, visibility in the Great Gulf Wilderness in New Hampshire. Our estimates were obtained
from a  mail survey of a random sample of 1,000 residents of New Hampshire, Vermont, and
Maine and on- and off-site personal surveys in New Hampshire and Massachusetts.   Visibility at
the study area, which is about one quarter mile northeast of the Mt. Washington summit, is
commonly impaired by regional haze that is largely a product of fossil fuel energy production.  
We review the WTP/WTA debate in the next section, followed by a description of the surveys
and the data.    The final section discusses the outcomes of these experiments and speculates onwhen, if ever, WTA measures should be used in CVM studies.
Background
As Adamowicz, Bhardwaj, and Macnab (1993) note, WTP and WTA for the same good
can (and generally are) vastly different.  Others have noted that the WTA measure is subject to a 
much higher degree of inaccuracy as compared to WTP measures (see e.g. Goldar and Misra,
2001; Coursey, Hovis, and Schulze, 1987; Brookshire and Coursey, 1987; Bishop and Heberlein,
1990).  A recent review of 45 studies which contrasted WTA and WTP by Horowitz and
McConnell (2000) found that WTA was often an order of magnitude or more greater than WTP. 
One study found that WTA was nearly 3,000 times WTP; on average (dropping this outlier), the
ratio WTA/WTP was about seven.  Due to the volatility of these estimates, WTP has generally
been the method of choice in CVM studies; for these and other reasons, the NOAA panel (Arrow
et al. 1993) reviewing CVM strongly recommended against the use of the WTA measure.  
Why the disparity between the measures?  Strict theory based on compensating and
equivalent variation measures notes that the income effect will cause some difference, though this
should be minimal (see Willig’s seminal 1976 paper).   Hanemann (1991: 635) has theorized that
a lack of substitutes for the good in question can lead to disparities between measures, noting
that “the difference between WTP and WTA depends not only on an income effect but also on a
substitution effect.”  Empirical support for this position has been mixed (see e.g. Adamowicz,
Bhardwaj, and Macnab, 1993; Shogren et al. 1994; Mantymaa, 1996).  
A second suspected source of the difference is survey construction, interviewing
technique, and other issues related to data collection (e.g. Brookshire et al. 1982; Dwyer and
Bowes, 1978).  However, the empirical evidence does not strongly support this reasoning
(Horowitz and McConnell, 2000).  Goldar and Misra (2001) attribute much of the disparity to the familiar hypothetical bias
problem, and propose methods for reducing this bias.  Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and others
note that individuals may value gains and losses differently.  In this case, respondent behavior is
logical given loss aversion. 
Zhao and Kling (2001) expand on the notion of uncertainty’s role in the difference.  In
essence, they argue that respondents forced to make a decision on the spot demand
compensation for this loss of quasi-option value (Arrow and Fisher, 1974) in the case of WTA,
and produce WTP bids less than their expected value of the good so as to insure not
“overpaying.”  Thus, in this framework, WTA bids are inflated by risk aversion while WTP bids
are deflated, thus increasing the WTA/WTP ratio.  Zhao and Kling provide some mixed evidence
of this effect examining past studies, although empirical work is still needed.  If their hypothesis
is true, efforts to collapse the WTA/WTP ratio would need to explicitly remove risk averting
behavior from the experiment.   In addition, if the difference in ratios is indeed related to risk
managing behavior, acceptance of Zhao and Kling’s reasoning may preclude a Goldar-Misra
explanation, and vice versa.
Finally, Horowitz and McConnell (2000) provide evidence that the WTA/WTP ratio
increases or decreases depending on the type of good valued, as well as the respondent’s
familiarity with the good.  Specifically, “non-ordinary” goods have significantly higher ratios than
ordinary (private) goods.  Thus, one would expect a good such as police protection to have a
lower ratio than biodiversity.
Willingness to Accept: Why Ask?
List and Shogren (2002:  219-220) note that “the recent hypothetical valuation literature
has been driven by compensatory natural resource damage assessment, which is closely tied toWTA measures of value.”  However, given the problems with WTA, many researchers have
chosen to use the seemingly more reasonable WTP estimates.   However, there are at least three
reasons why a WTA format might be preferred.  First, from a theoretical perspective, property
rights to a clean environment are often assumed to belong to the public, and consequently
environmental losses should be evaluated using a WTA measure ( Harper, 2000).  If as suggested
by Kahneman et al. (1990), individuals value losses more highly than gains, willingness to pay
estimates could severely understate value.  Second, given certain goods, WTA may be a more
realistic scenario; for example, with deregulation of electricity generation, acceptance of an
increase in air pollution in exchange for cheaper electricity.  Finally, as Horowitz and McConnell
(2000: 4, citing Knetsch [1990])  point out, “one of the most economically consequential
decisions will be the initial (authors’ emphasis) establishment of property rights, especially for
environmental and other public amenities for which property rights are unclear.”  Thus, the
choice of WTA vs. WTP has major ramifications both from an empirical standpoint and from a
property rights regime.  
Study Background and Previous Visibility Studies
Deregulation of electricity markets, in spite of the events of recent years in California, has
been moving forward on the policy agenda.  As Burtraw, Krupnick, and Palmer (1996) note, the
“natural monopoly” status of this utility is being eroded by technological changes.  As they state:
Because new, cleaner plants are not expected to dominate the industry for some time,
there is concern about increased use of existing facilities....most often by states in the
Northeast, who fear that more open access to electricity transmissions will increase coal-
fired generation in the midwest.  
Moves toward deregulation are also fueled by the notion that the current system does not serve
to keep prices low enough (Ando and Palmer, 1998).  Not surprisingly the states which have1Many of these studies were modeled after research and ideas developed or presented at a
1982 conference on visual values (Rowe and Chestnut, 1983).
some of the highest electricity costs in the country are those which are moving toward
deregulation, including New Hampshire.  Simulations by Palmer and Burtraw (1996) confirm
that increased power generation in the Midwest and MidAtlantic states will contribute to
increased loading of certain pollutants over the northeast.  These results are consistent with
prevailing weather patterns which tend to sweep pollutants toward and over New England
(NERA, 2001) , leading to the region’s dubious moniker of “the tailpipe of the United States.” 
With these increased emissions will come decreased visibility, the subject matter for this study.
Most previous studies of the value of visibility in wilderness (or remote) areas have used
the contingent valuation method (CVM).  One of the first studies was conducted by Rowe, et al.
(1980) who found that non-residents were willing to pay about $4 per day to preserve visual
range in southwestern Colorado.  Schulze et. al. (1983) reported that residents of Los Angeles,
Denver, Albuquerque and Chicago were willing to pay $3.75 to $5.14 per month to preserve
visibility in the Grand Canyon.  Crocker and Shogren (1991) estimated that residents were
willing to pay about $3.00 per day to preserve visibility in the Cascades of Washington State. 
And, Chestnut and Rowe (1990) found that respondents were willing to pay $4.35 per month to
avoid a change in average levels of visibility in the Grand Canyon, Yosemite and Shenandoah
National Parks.
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With respect to wilderness areas in the northeast, the Appalachian Mountain Club (AMC)
administered a survey in the summer of 1996 to ascertain visitor’s perceptions of visibility in the
White Mountain National Forest.  This survey was administered to individuals at three sites:  The
Pinkham Notch visitors’ center at the base of Mt. Washington, the Cardigan lodge at the base of2It is worth noting that the changes in visibility from status quo depicted were quite large,
so that care should be taken in interpretation of this variable.
Mt. Cardigan and the Mt Washington Observatory (at the top of Mt. Washington).  This survey
asked respondents to rate photographs of Mt. Jefferson, a mountain in the Class 1 Presidential
Dry River airshed, at various visibility conditions.  Each photograph was correlated with a
measurement of optical extinction measured by a nephelometer at the site where the photograph
was taken.  Results of this survey show that individuals were able to consistently perceive
different levels of visibility.  That is, respondents were clearly able to differentiate between
improvements and degradations to visibility (Hill, 2000).
The Model
The visibility study which provided the data for this paper was subject to considerable
analyses to examine relationships, test hypotheses, and examine functional forms (Harper, 2000;
Stevens et al. 2000; Porras, 1999).  Based on these previous uses of the data, a parsimonious
form of the model to be tested was developed:
Pr(bid acceptance) = Pr(WTP>Bid) or Pr(WTA<Offer)
where    WTA/WTP = F(INCOME, FVISIT, BID, VISLOSS)
It is common to assume a linear function:
WTA/WTP = . + ￿1 INCOME + ￿2 FVISIT +  ￿3 BID  + ￿4 VISIBILITY+ 0
where variable descriptions are provided in Table 1.  This basic formulation was the same for
both the WTP and the WTA models.  It was expected that the BID and VISIBILITY
2 variables
would have opposite signs across the two models.  For example, the BID variable was expected
to have a positive effect on the WTA model and a negative effect on the WTP model.  Both log
and semi-log forms were examined in the current analysis.  Survey Design and Data Collection
A case study of visibility in the Great Gulf Wilderness in New Hampshire was undertaken
during the winter, spring and summer, 1999, and during summer of 2000.  Visibility at the study
area, which is about one quarter mile northeast of the Mt. Washington summit, is commonly
impaired by regional haze that is largely a product of fossil fuel energy production (Hill, et al.,
2000).
Four surveys were used to measure the value of visibility in the Great Gulf Wilderness
region.  The first survey (WTA) was administered onsite by a trained interviewer who used a
personal computer (laptop) to present respondents with computer modeled images derived from
the WinHaze Visual Air Quality Program.  This program allowed us to hold weather conditions
constant (cloud cover) while changing visibility only.   The second survey was identical in all
respects except that it was administered offsite to individuals residing in the Northampton/
Amherst area in Western Massachusetts (about a 3 to 4 hour drive from the study site).  The
third survey (WTA) was conducted by mail and involved a random sample of 500 New England
residents.  The fourth survey (WTP) was conducted by mail of a random sample of 500 residents
of New Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine.
The first section of the surveys asked respondents to rate several pictures according to
the amount of haze in each.  Each picture was a view taken from Camp Dodge, directly across
from the Great Gulf Wilderness that had been altered by WinHaze to simulate different levels of
atmospheric pollution, all else held constant (cloud cover, etc).  Respondents to the personal
survey were asked to rate 15 pictures while mail survey respondents rated 4 pictures.
The CVM question was then presented.  Following an introductory statement about
electricity deregulation and air quality in the White Mountains (see appendix), each respondent3 Twenty percent is the average savings expected from deregulation.
viewed two pictures in this section: picture A represented the status quo visibility and electric bill
while picture B represented reduced visibility and a lower electric bill.  The CVM questions were
asked as follows:
1. WTA: Would you be willing to accept this new level of visibility (indicated by picture B) in
the White Mountain National Forest if your monthly electric bill were reduced by $x?
2. WTP: Would you be willing to pay $x per month more for electricity to avoid this new level
of visibility (indicated by picture B) in the White Mountain National Forest?
In all cases, picture A, which represented the base scenario, or status quo, described the
average visibility level at the site during the summer months.  Picture B represented one of four
visual range reductions. The electric bill reduction was 20 percent of the respondent’s total
monthly bill in the personal survey and one of 1/4th, 1/3rd, or ½ of the monthly bill for the first
mail survey respondents,
3 while respondents to the second mail survey were confronted with bids
ranging from $10 to $50 per month (these values were chosen based on the initial year surveys).  
A series of follow up questions were asked to obtain information about each respondent’s
socio-economic characteristics, motives involved in answering the valuation question, and plans,
if any, to visit the wilderness area in the future.
Double wave mailings with postcard follow ups were used in each mail survey.  Response
rates were approximately 36 percent for the WTA survey and 39 percent for the WTP survey. 
The WTA and WTP  CVM questions followed an introductory statement about
electricity deregulation and air quality in the White Mountains.  Each respondent viewed two
pictures: picture A represented the status quo visibility and electric bill while picture B
represented reduced visibility.  In all cases, picture A, which represented the base scenario, or10
status quo, described the average visibility level at the site during the summer months. 
Results
WTP.  Results from the analysis of the WTP survey data were consistent with prior
expectations.  Higher income and larger improvements in visibility increased the probability that
the respondent would accept the bid offered, while higher bids in turn lowered this probability.
Thirty three percent of respondents in the sample accepted the offered bid.  The model correctly
predicted 70.3 percent of responses.
  In a linear model, estimated mean and median will be the same since both logistic and
normal distributions are symmetrical.  The general formula to compute the mean WTP/WTA
estimate (and the median for the log-linear model) is ￿1X/￿.  Estimates of the median economic
value of visibility derived from the semi-log WTP logit models were calculated by the following
formula:
Pr(Accept) = 1/(1 + e 
- (. + ￿ Ln Compensation))
where . and ￿ are estimated parameters.  
WTA.  Results from the WTA survey analysis are also shown in Table 2.  Relatively few
respondents were willing to make a tradeoff between electricity bills and reduced visibility (20.1
percent).  The model correctly predicted 80.6 percent of responses.  The probability of future
visits (FVISIT) and the amount of visibility loss (VISLOSS) both reduced the probability of a
“yes” response.  A surprising result was that the amount of compensation offered did not have a
statistically significant effect on respondents.  This seemingly counterintuitive result will be
discussed later.
That relatively few respondents were willing to accept a tradeoff between visibility and4Log results were essentially identical to linear results in terms of statistical significance of
coefficients.  As with the linear model, the coefficient of the BID variable was not statistically
significant.
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electricity cost is not surprising.  In this study average electricity bill reductions were only about
$18 per month.  However, it is important to stress that the scenarios presented are thought to be
very realistic given projected conditions for electricity deregulation in New England (Harper,
2000).
Comparison and Discussion of WTA and WTP Results
That WTA and WTP would vary widely is no surprise, given past empirical studies. 
Table 3 illustrates that this finding was also the case in the current study.  As noted, the ratio of
WTA/WTP ranged from about 12 to 13.  Different calculations were performed; WTP1 and
WTA1 are derived using the mean variable values from the individual data sets, while WTP2 and
WTA2 combine the data sets and use the joint sample means.
4  
The means ratio of 12-13 is within the range of previous studies, as found by McConnell
and Horowitz (2000).  The value of WTP1 of $11.06/month is comparable to previous studies of
visibility valuation.  What is more troubling is the problem in calculating median WTA.  While
median WTP of $11.07/month is quite similar to mean WTP, we were basically unable to
calculate median WTA (in fact, the estimate “exploded,” giving implausible estimates in the
range of several million dollars).  This was likely due to the inability of the BID variable to
explain much of the variability in the WTA model, as the coefficient was statistically not
significant.  In effect, this means that the variance of the coefficient of the BID variable in the
WTA model was quite high (relative to the coefficient size).  It also brings into question the
whether the means ratio WTA/WTP can be interpreted with any degree of confidence.  The12
question begs, then, why would the amount of compensation offered to respondents have no
influence on their decision to trade visibility for lower electric bills?  
We propose three possible reasons, one an artifact of the survey design, two grounded in
economic theory.  First, it may simply be the case that the compensation levels offered in the
survey were simply not high enough to move respondents to accept the program.  The bids were
of necessity bounded by the respondent’s electric bill, and the percentage reductions in the bids
were based on estimates of bill reductions due to deregulation.  In effect, the study may have
suffered from being “too realistic”; yet, as a tool to analyze the policy of deregulation, this
realism in vehicle design is necessary.  In this case, the results are far more interesting from a
policy perspective than from a methodological perspective.  As more states move toward
deregulation, considerations of full costs of the policy will need to incorporate realistic features
in terms of payment vehicles, reasonable reimbursement levels, and appropriate information on
possible changes in air quality/visibility.  
A second reason for the behavior of the BID variable coefficient is the uncertainty
hypothesis advanced by Zhao and Kling.  In this case, one would expect WTP to be an
underestimate of “true” values while WTA would be an overestimate.  This relates to the
uncertainty of the respondent’s value of the good in question or, by extension in this case, the
probability that the policy/contribution would have the desired effect on air quality/visibility.
The third and final reason relates to the Hanemann hypothesis regarding goods with no
good substitutes.  In effect, this would be interpreted such that there would be no substitutes for
visibility/air quality, and so respondents simply would not make the trade for money.  Analysis of
comments on survey forms indicated that, while we tried to focus attention strictly on visibility in13
the immediate region, it was clear that respondents were valuing broader commodities such as
health effects of air quality degradation.  
In the first case, it is possible that a survey instrument could be designed which would
allow a high enough “ceiling” to stabilize the BID coefficient.  In the latter two cases, the model
is not the problem; in fact, there is no “problem.”  Most respondents (80 percent) are simply not
willing to part with a good which they “own”, visibility/air quality.  This position can be justified
on theoretical grounds.  The fact that the size of BID does influence WTP estimates is not at all
contradictory in this case.  Since property rights have been reassigned in the WTP scenario,
respondents are left with no choice but to buy back the good.  This also may partly explain that
while bid offers were comparable across the two groups, the percentage of yes respondents in
the WTP survey was substantially higher than that in the WTA survey (33 vs. 20 percent).  It is
entirely possible that the difference between WTA and WTP, rather than being an anomaly or an
artifact of hypothetical bias, is consistent with theoretical models of consumer behavior, and
certainly merits further examination.  In the final analysis, trying to “deflate” WTA estimates to
make them more “reasonable” may actually turn out to be data manipulation which contradicts
theoretical expectations!14
Table 1.  Logit Model WTP/WTA Specifications:   Socioeconomic
Characteristics of Respondents (Sample Means).
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Table 2.  Results of Logit Models:  WTP to Avoid Visibility Loss and WTA






























Chi-Squared 33.04469 (4 d.f.)       23.87060 (4 d.f.)
% of Correct Predictions 70.3 80.6
*** significant at .01 level
** significant at .05 level
* significant at .10 level16











a Estimated mean WTP for 131 km of visibility, mean income, and fvisit of WTP data.
b Estimated mean WTA for 129 km of visibility, mean income, and fvisit of WTA data.
cEstimated mean WTP for 147 km of visibility, mean income, and fvisit of WTP/WTA
combined data)
dMedian WTA estimates could not be calculated, as described in text.
eRatio of (Mean WTA)/(Mean WTP)17
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Appendix 
Sample WTP Question
Section 2.   For the next question, consider the following:  Currently, many states are debating the issue of deregulation of the electric utility
industry.  If deregulation occurs in your state, you may be able to choose your own power provider.  Assume for the purposes of this question
that cheaper power (that is, less than what you currently pay) is available through a mid-western power company.  Further, this power company
produces electricity by burning coal.  Increased demand for this company's cheaper power will contribute to air pollution and poor visibility in the
White Mountains of New Hampshire.
TPlease enter your estimated average monthly electric bill US$____________
Now suppose picture A represents the level of visibility most often experienced in this region during the summer months.  Further suppose that
you are faced with a situation where the visibility level changes to that in picture B.  For the purpose of this question, assume that visibility would
change ONLY in the White Mountain National Forest in New Hampshire.
TWould you be willing to pay $_______ per month more for electricity to avoid this new level of visibility (indicated by picture B) in the
White Mountain National Forest? 
YES NO
B A